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Actionable Acts:
"Severe" Conduct in Hostile Work
Environment Sexual Harassment Cases

JA1ES CONCANNONt
This paper examines the significant weight that courts
accord proof of especially "severe" conduct in hostile work
environment sexual harassment cases. Such conduct is
often found by courts to satisfy the "severe or pervasive"
test established by the Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., even if the plaintiff does not present proof
that the harassing conduct occurred with great frequency.'
Part I provides an introduction to the Supreme Court's
hostile work environment jurisprudence and the origins of
the severe or pervasive test. Part II begins the exploration
into the disjunctive nature of the severe or pervasive test.
Part II(a) examines instances when egregious verbal
harassment has been found to satisfy the severe or
pervasive test, despite the infrequency of such harassment.
Part II(b) focuses on the severity of different types of
physical harassment-harassment that involves the
touching of the victim by the harasser. Part II(c) examines
the role of implicit and explicit threats of physical harm in
the severity calculus. Part III explores two types of "severe"
conduct that are specific to high-risk professions. Part 111(a)
examines the severity of refusals to provide backup in such
professions, while Part III(b) considers conduct that serves
to diminish employees' authority and undermine
cohesiveness in a way that some courts have found to pose a
threat to the safety of the victims of the harassment and
others.
t Law Clerk to the Honorable Joe Billy McDade, United States District Court
for the Central District of Illinois. J.D., Columbia Law School, 2011. B.A.,
Northwestern University, 2006. Special thanks to Professors Anne Vladeck and
Debra Raskin, for whom the original draft of this Article was written, to
BJGLSP Publications Editor Caitlin Higgins, and to BJGLSP Editor in Chief
Anne Rosenbaum. I would also like to thank Professor Lance Liebman, the
Honorable Theodore Katz, and Professor James Tierney for the invaluable
guidance they provided throughout my law school career. This Article is
dedicated to my father, Michael Concannon.
I Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
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INTRODUCTION TO HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
I.
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE "SEVERE OR PERVASIVE" TEST

Although discrimination in employment based on sex
was explicitly banned in the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, it was not until 1982 that a circuit court recognized
that sexual harassment was a violation of Title VII.2 n
Henson v. City of Dundee, the Eleventh Circuit, reversing
the lower court, found that "under certain circumstances
the creation of an offensive or hostile work environment due
to sexual harassment can violate Title VII irrespective of
whether the complainant suffers tangible job detriment."
The Supreme Court finally addressed the issue four years
later in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.' In Meritor,
the plaintiff alleged she had "constantly been subjected to
sexual harassment" in the form of unwelcome touching,
coerced sexual intercourse, and even rape, by a vice
president of the bank over a four-year period.' The Court
affirmed the D.C. Circuit's reversal of the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant,
finding that "a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title
VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created
a hostile working environment," and that "harassment
leading to noneconomic injury can violate Title VII." 6
In coming to the conclusion that "hostile work
environment" discrimination was actionable under Title
VII, the Court pointed to the Sexual Harassment Guidelines
that had been promulgated by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 1980.' The EEOC
Guidelines provide that
[ulnwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to
such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2)
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006); see 1 MARK A.
LAw § 2.14 (4th ed. 2009).
3 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982).
4 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
5 Id. at 60.
2

6

Id. at 65-66 (emphasis added).
at 65.

7Id.

ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT
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submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's
work performance
or
creating
an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.8

The first category is known as "quid pro quo" harassment,
where "the employer conditions a benefit on some form of
sexual favor. The second category is referred to as
"tangible employment action," a phrase drawn from the
Supreme Court's decision in Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth." In Ellerth, the Court held that an employer is
vicariously liable for sexual harassment under Title VII if
that harassment culminates in a tangible employment
action against the employee-victim." The third category is
the "hostile work environment claim."l2 In Ellerth the Court
clarified that when a "claim involves only unfulfilled
threats, it should be categorized as a hostile work
environment claim which requires a showing of severe or
pervasive conduct" to be actionable."
The "severe or pervasive" requirement was first used by
the Supreme Court in the sexual harassment context in
Meritor. There the Court noted that "[flor sexual
harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe
or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment."'"
But what type of conduct is "sufficiently severe or
pervasive" to create such an environment? The Court
refused to draw bright lines in Meritor, instead pointing
again to the EEOC Guidelines, which "emphasize that the
trier of fact must determine the existence of sexual
harassment in light of 'the record as a whole' and 'the
totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the
sexual advances and the context in which the alleged
829

C.F.R.

§ 1604.11(a) (2011).

SROTHSTEIN ET AL., supranote 2, at 297.

10 524 U.S. 742, 753 (1998).
11 Id. at 762-63.
12
Id. at 754.
13 Id. (emphasis added).
14 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (quoting Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
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incidents occurred.""' However, the Court did establish that
"[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the
alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome,"' not whether
"sex-related conduct was 'voluntary,' in the sense that the
complainant was not forced to participate against her
will."l6 This was an important point in Meritor, as the
plaintiff there had been coerced into having sex with her
superior, "unwelcome" conduct she "voluntarily" complied
with out of fear of losing her job."
Despite Meritor, lower courts were left with relatively
little guidance as to what constituted sufficiently severe or
pervasive conduct. Seven years after Meritor the Supreme
Court provided some direction on the issue of severity and
pervasiveness, holding in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
that while
[clertainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously
affect a reasonable person's psychological well-being, . .
. the statute is not limited to such conduct. So long as
the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is
perceived, as hostile or abusive,.

.

. there is no need for

it also to be psychologically injurious.' 8

Before Harris,at least three circuit courts had held that in
order to be actionable as a hostile work environment, the
employee's psychological well-being must be "seriously
affected," or that the conduct in question led the plaintiff to
"suffer injury."l9 The Harris Court then put some meat on
the bones of the objective and subjective requirements of the
hostile work environment, holding that the conduct needed
to be both "objectively hostile or abusive . .. [productive of]
an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile
or abusive," and subjectively abusive to the victim.2 0 Still,

15 Id. at 69 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)).
16

Id. at 68.

17

Id.

510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
19 Id. at 20. Compare Vance v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 863
F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989) (requiring conduct to have a serious effect on
the plaintiffs psychological well-being), Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805
F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (same), and Downes v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 775
F.2d 288, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (same), with Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 87778 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the "serious effect" requirement).
20
Harris,510 U.S. at 21-22.
18
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the Court noted that the test for severity or pervasiveness
"is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically
precise test."" However, the Court did provide some factors
that courts could take into account in weighing the
circumstances,
including
"the frequency
of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance;
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's
work performance."" Although Meritor was the first case to
use the "severe or pervasive" language, Harris's rather
limited elaboration was apparently sufficiently decisive to
gain credit for the origination of the severe or pervasive
test.23
The Supreme Court gave further substantive clues as to
the type of conduct prohibited by Title VII in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., a same-sex sexual
harassment case.24 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Scalia emphasized the importance of the context of the
alleged harassment, noting that "the objective severity of
harassment should be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the plaintiffs position . . . ." Justice
Scalia cited Harrisfor this proposition, but the "plaintiffs
position" langage was a new piece to the puzzle provided
by the Court. Justice Scalia also pushed back against the
defendant's contention that Title VII was being turned into
a "general civility code for the American workplace."2 7 He
noted that
[iun . . . harassment cases,

.

. .

[the] inquiry requires

careful consideration of the social context in which
particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its
target. A professional football player's working
environment is not severely or pervasively abused, for
example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he
heads onto the field--even if the same behavior would
21
22

Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.

23 See, e.g., Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 426 (3d Cir. 2001) (referring
to the severe or pervasive test as "Harris' 'severe and pervasive' test").
24 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
25 Id. (emphasis added).
26 See id. (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 22).
27 See id. at 80.
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reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach's
secretary .. . back at the office. ... Common sense, and
an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable
courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing
or roughhousing . . . and conduct which a reasonable

person in the plaintiffs position would find severely
hostile or abusive. 28

Needless to say, the Court's "use your common sense"
directive probably provided little solace to lawyers
defending employers in sexual harassment cases. Three
months after Oncale was decided, the Court in Faragherv.
City of Boca Raton reaffirmed that the inquiry was to be a
factual one, and expressed its belief that such a standard
would be sufficient to weed out meritless claims.29 The Court
again pushed back against accusations that Title VII had
been turned into a general civility code, stating that "[a]
recurring point in . . . [this Court's] opinions is that 'simple
teasing,' . . . offhand comments, and isolated incidents

(unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory
changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment."'"
Three years after Oncale and Faragher the Supreme
Court further stressed the importance of the "objectively
hostile or abusive" component of a hostile work environment
finding. The allegedly harassing conduct in Clark County
School District v. Breeden consisted of one comment made
while three employees-two men and one woman-were
going over a job applicant's file." A notation in the file
indicated that the applicant had made the comment, "I hear
that making love to you is like making love to the Grand
Canyon."32 One of the male employees read this out loud and
chuckled with the other male employee.3 3 The female
employee complained about the comment, and then was
transferred to a position she found to be less desirable.3 4 She
sued, claiming that the transfer was retaliatory in violation
28

Id. at 81-82.

29

524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).

30 Id.
31532 U.S. 268, 269-70 (2001).
32

Id. at 269.

33 Id.

34

See id. at 271-72.
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of Title VII." The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion,
reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that "[n]o reasonable
person could have believed that the single incident . . .
violated Title VII's standard.""
As Justice O'Connor had noted in Harris,the "severe or
pervasive" test handed down by the Supreme Court "is not,
and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise
test." 7 Indeed, in his concurring opinion in Harris,Justice
Scalia criticized the indeterminacy of the test, arguing that
"[a]s a practical matter, today's holding lets virtually
unguided juries decide whether sex-related conduct engaged
in (or permitted by) an employer is egregious enough to
warrant an award of damages."" However, after pointing
out its flaws, Justice Scalia concurred anyway, stating that
"I know of no test more faithful to the inherently vague
statutory language than the one the Court today adopts.""
In Justice Scalia's eyes, at least, the "severe or pervasive"
test appears to be an example of the Court doing the best it
can with what little Congress gave them to work with.
II. SEVERE OR PERVASIVE?-WHEN SEVERE BUT INFREQUENT
HARASSMENT IS ACTIONABLE

A. Egregious Verbal Harassment
With rather limited guidance from the Supreme Court,
lower courts were tasked with adding substance to the
"severe or pervasive" test that the Court had sketched out.
One difficulty that courts faced was determining how to
balance the severity of the harassment with its
pervasiveness. In Carrero v. New York City Housing
Authority, the Second Circuit held that a lack of frequency
of offensive conduct did not prevent a plaintiff from
succeeding on a hostile work environment claim if the
conduct was sufficiently objectionable.4 0 The defendant in
the case had argued that "federal law does not punish
'trivial behavior' consisting of only 'two kisses, three arm3

See id. at 270.

36 See id. at 271.

510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
Id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
3 Id. at 25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
40 890 F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1989).

3

38

8
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epithets
and
other
strokes,'
several
degrading
objectionable-but ultimately harmless-conduct."4 ' The
court disagreed:
We emphatically reject this argument. A female employee
need not subject herself to an extended period of
demeaning and degrading provocation before being
entitled to seek the remedies provided under Title VII. It is
not how long the sexual innuendos, slurs, verbal assaults,
or obnoxious course of conduct lasts. The offensiveness of
the individual actions complained of is also a factor to be
considered in determining whether such actions are

pervasive. 42
This is a somewhat puzzling way to phrase the rule. What
the court appears to be saying, rather, is that the degree of
offensiveness of the actions complained about-in other
words, the severity of the actions-should be considered
when one is determining whether the conduct was
sufficiently severe or pervasive.
Many other courts have found that even relatively few
incidents of harassing conduct can meet the severe or
pervasive test when that conduct is particularly offensive or
egregious. The bar for such conduct is especially high, as
courts have pointed out that "[ilsolated instances of
harassment ordinarily do not rise to" the level of actionable
harassment; "[rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate either
that a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a
series of incidents were 'sufficiently continuous and
concerted' to have altered the conditions of her working
environment."4 3 As to how many incidents constitute such a
"series," courts have repeatedly cautioned that "there is
neither a threshold 'magic number' of harassing incidents
that gives rise, without more, to liability as a matter of law
nor a number of incidents below which a plaintiff fails as a
matter of law to state a claim."" For instance, in Rodgers v.
Id.
Id.
43 Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal citation
omitted).
4 Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 1993);
see also Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 437 (2d Cir.
1999) (same), abrogatedon other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68-69 (2006).
41

42
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Western-Southern Life Insurance Co., a Seventh Circuit
hostile environment race discrimination case, the court
found that four remarks, only one of which was directed at
the plaintiff, were sufficient to create a racially hostile work
environment.4 5 The analysis focused on one comment in
particular that the court found to be especially hostile: a
"motivational speech" (as the defendant characterized it) in
which the district sales manager told the plaintiffs
employees that "[y]ou black guys are too fucking dumb to be
insurance agents."46
Similarly, in Smith v. Northwest FinancialAcceptance,
Inc., a Tenth Circuit hostile environment sex discrimination
case, the court found that six comments directed at or made
near the plaintiff were "sufficient for the court to conclude
that a reasonable person would find Plaintiffs work
environment hostile or pervasive."4 The court seemed to
suggest that three of the "sexually disparaging remarks"
made by a supervisor-telling the plaintiff to "get a little
this weekend" so she would "come back in a better mood,"
that the plaintiff "would be the worst piece of ass that [he]
ever had," and that the plaintiff "must be a sad piece of ass"
who "can't keep a man" -- when taken together would have
been "severe enough to affect a reasonable person's identity
as a woman."4 8 Although the offensiveness to which the
plaintiff was subjected occurred rather infrequently, the
court emphasized that the Meritortest "is a disjunctive one,
requiring that the harassing conduct be sufficiently
pervasive or sufficiently severe to alter the terms,
conditions, or privileges of Plaintiffs employment."4 9
45 12 F.3d 668, 671, 673 (7th Cir. 1993). Although this paper focuses on hostile

work environment sexual harassment, some examples of hostile environment
race discrimination cases are used where the standards applied and inquiries
engaged in by the courts are functionally the same as those applied and engaged
in by courts in hostile work environment sexual harassment cases. Courts
commonly use hostile work environment race discrimination claims while
analyzing hostile work environment sexual harassment claims, and vice versa.
See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) ("Courts of
Appeals in sexual harassment cases have properly drawn on standards
developed in cases involving racial harassment.").
46 Rodgers, 12 F.3d at 675.
47 129 F.3d 1408, 1414-15 (10th Cir. 1997).
4Id. at 1413-14.
49
d. at 1413.

10
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Taken together, the above cases stand for the proposition
that a significant showing of severity can overcome a
relative lack of frequency (or "pervasiveness") of such
conduct. This is so even if the conduct in question consists
only of verbal harassment. This interpretation of the severe
or pervasive test is faithful to the Supreme Court's
statement in Harris that "whether an environment is
'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all
the circumstances."" If such circumstances indicate that
especially egregious (but infrequent) verbal harassment
"would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived,... [to be]
hostile or abusive," a court may find that a plaintiff has
satisfied the severe or pervasive test."
B. PhysicalHarassment
The language in the Supreme Court's decision in Harris
seems to imply that physical harassment-harassment that
involves the touching of the victim by the harasser--carries
significant weight in a "severe or pervasive" analysis.5 2 After
pervasiveness
as
relevant
and
listing severity
considerations, the Court suggests that courts might also
consider "whether . . . [the discriminatory conduct] is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance."53 The EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual
Harassment addressed the issue more explicitly in 1990,
asserting that "[t]he Commission will presume that the
unwelcome, unintentional touching of a charging party's
intimate body areas is sufficiently offensive to alter the
conditions of her working environment . . . ." As to nonintimate conduct, the Commission found that "[wihen the
victim is the target of both verbal and non-intimate physical
conduct, the hostility of the environment is exacerbated and
a violation is more likely to be found.""
Some "intimate physical conduct" has been found to be
so severe as to allow for a "severe or pervasive" finding even
50

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
Id. at 22-23.
52 Id. at 23.
53 Id. (emphasis added).
54 EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 Fair Emp. Prac. Man.
(BNA), at 405:6690 (Mar. 19, 1990).
55
Id. at 405:6691.
51
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if the conduct occurred only once. The EEOC Policy
Guidance specifically contemplates such situations, noting
that "a single, unusually severe incident of harassment may
be sufficient to constitute a Title VII violation .

..

. This is

particularly true when the harassment is physical."" In
Ferrisv. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the Second Circuit found that
the "physical harassment" that took place in one incident
was sufficiently severe to create a hostile work
environment." Ferrisinvolved the drugging and rape of a
flight attendant by her co-worker while the two were
waiting to leave Rome to work on a flight bound for the
United States." Judge Weinstein noted that "[a]lthough a
continuing pattern of hostile or abusive behavior is
ordinarily required to establish a hostile environment, a
single instance can suffice when it is sufficiently egregious.
We have no doubt that a single incident of rape can satisfy
[the severe or pervasive test] . . . ."" Similarly, in Al-

Dabbagh v. Greenpeace, Inc., Judge Milton Shadur of the
Northern District of Illinois found that a fellow employee's
beating, choking, and rape of the plaintiff created a hostile
work environment. 0 Also, in Little v. Windermere
Relocation, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that even if "three
rapes in the course of one evening constitutes a 'single'
incident" of harassment, such an incident "can support a
claim of hostile work environment because the 'frequency of
the discriminatory conduct' is only one factor in the
analysis.""
Not all successful single-incident claims involve rape,
however. In Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., the Tenth Circuit
found that the actions of a customer against the plaintiff
waitress-grabbing her hair, breast, and putting his mouth
on her breast---constituted "physically threatening and
humiliating behavior which unreasonably interfered with"
the plaintiffs work, and were "severe enough to create an
actionable hostile work environment."6 2 Similarly, in Jones
v. U.S. Gypsum, Chief Judge Mark Bennett of the Northern
5

6 Id. at 405:6690.

5
58

277 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2001).

Id. at 131.
59
Id. at 136.
873 F. Supp. 1105, 1108, 1111 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
61 301 F.3d 958, 967 (9th Cir. 2002).
62 162 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir. 1998).
60

12
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District of Iowa found that the complaint of a male
employee who had been intentionally struck in the groin by
a female co-worker (who had struck other male employees
similarly in the past) contained "sufficient allegations of a
single episode severe enough to create an actionable hostile
work environment.'
Still, cases in which a single incident was found to be
sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to support a hostile work
environment claim are exceedingly rare. This is so even
when the conduct in question involves unwelcome and
aggressive physical (and even intimate) touching. In the oftcited case Brooks v. City of San Mateo, the Ninth Circuit
held that a "reasonable woman" would not consider "the
terms and conditions of her employment altered" if a male
co-worker touched her bare stomach and then, upon being
forcefully rebuffed, trapped her against her desk and forced
his hands up her shirt and underneath her bra.' In a recent
case from the Northern District of Georgia, the court, citing
Justice Scalia's comments in Oncale that Title VII "does not
impose a 'general civility code for the American workplace,'"
found that a plaintiff who had been cornered and groped in
a manner similar to that in Brooks failed to establish
"severe or pervasive" conduct on the part of the defendant."
But proof of multiple acts of physical touching, or
combinations of physical touching and instances of verbal
harassment, are often devastating to defendants. This is the
case even if the incidents took place over a relatively short
period of time. For example, in Hostetler v. Quality Dining,
Inc., the plaintiff alleged that a supervisor had harassed her
on three occasions: once when the supervisor "grabbed her
face and stuck his tongue down her throat"; again the next
day when the supervisor "placed his hands on her back,
grasped her brassiere, and began to unfasten it"; and a
third time (during the same week as the other two
incidents) when the supervisor publicly "told her, in crude
terms, that he could perform oral sex on her so effectively
63

No. C99-3047-MWB, 2000 WL 196616, at *1, *3 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 21, 2000).

64 229 F.3d 917, 926 (9th Cir. 2000).
65

Demmons v. Fulton County, No. 1:09-CV-2312-TWT-WEJ, 2010 WL 3418325,
at *12 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 2, 2010); see also Del Valle Fontanez v. Aponte, 660 F.
Supp. 145, 146-47, 149 (D.P.R. 1987) (holding that a single incident in which
plaintiffs employer locked office door and pressed genitals against plaintiff was
insufficiently severe or pervasive as a matter of law).
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that she would do cartwheels." As to the severity of the
supervisor's harassment, the court stated that it had
no doubt that the type of conduct at issue here falls on
the actionable side of the line dividing abusive conduct
from behavior that is merely vulgar or mildly offensive.
Two of the three acts at issue in this case involved
unwelcome, forcible physical contact of a rather intimate
nature.

. .

. A reasonable person in Hostetler's position

might well experience that type of behavior as
humiliating, and quite possibly threatening... . Even the
lewd remark that . .. [the supervisor] allegedly made to

Hostetler was more than a casual obscenity.

After ruminating on the severity of the incidents, the court

then turned to the question of whether the three acts
complained of-all of which took place during one weekwere "severe enough, without the added weight of repetition
over time or cumulation with other acts of harassment, to
stand alone as the basis for a harassment claim."" The
court focused primarily on the physical conduct, noting that
[p]hysical harassment lies along a continuum just as
verbal harassment does. There are some forms of
physical contact which, although unwelcome and
uncomfortable for the person touched, are relatively
minor.

. .

. Even more intimate or more crude physical

acts-a hand on the thigh, a kiss on the lips, a pinch of
the buttocks-may be considered insufficiently abusive
to be described as "severe" when they occur in isolation. .
. . [But] [wihen the harassment moves beyond the sort of
casual contact which (if it were consensual) might be
expected between friendly co-workers, and manifests in
more intimate, intrusive forms of contact, it becomes
increasingly difficult to write the conduct off as a
pedestrian annoyance.

The court ultimately refused to "write the conduct off,"
finding that "[tihe physical, intimate, and forcible character
66218 F.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2000).
67

68
69

Id. at 807-08.
Id. at 808.
Id.
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of the acts at issue here persuades us that a factfinder could
deem Hostetler's work environment hostile."70
In another Seventh Circuit case, Worth v. Tyer, the court
found that five instances of unwelcome touching of varying
inappropriateness-the president of the company stroked
the plaintiffs hand, rubbed her neck and shoulders for
several minutes, stroked her face and hair, touched her
"backside and leg," and then grabbed her breast-over the
course of two days could be sufficiently severe or pervasive
to create an objectively hostile work environment, despite
the fact that the time period over which the conduct
occurred was so short." In so finding, the court noted that
"[tihe fact that .

.

. [this] conduct .

.

. involves touching as

opposed to verbal behavior increases the severity of the
situation."72 In Barna v. City of Cleveland, the Sixth Circuit
applied the severe or pervasive test to a situation in which
the plaintiff was frequently verbally harassed for a rather
short period of time-two-and-a-half weeks-and physically
grabbed once during that period." The court found
"abundant evidence to support the jury's verdict" in favor of
the plaintiff, noting that while most of the comments were
"less 'severe' but certainly very 'frequent,"' two actions by
the perpetrator of the harassment--one in which the
plaintiff was "directly asked .. . for oral sex," and another in
which the harasser "grabbed her and squeezed her"
(apparently in some sort of bear hug)-were very severe and
"alone might be enough to support a finding of a hostile
environment, even apart from . . . [the harasser's] other

comments."7 4
The above cases stand for the general rule that physical
harassment is usually considered to be severe. The type of
physical harassment-whether it is intimate or nonintimate-will most likely play a significant role in a court's
determination of how severe such conduct is, and, as a
result, what showing of pervasiveness will be required to
pass Harris'ssevere or pervasive test. Although the Seventh
Circuit may have been correct in Hostetler when it stated
70

Id. at 808-09.

71 276 F.3d 249, 256-57, 268 (7th Cir. 2001).
72

Id. at 268.
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No. 96-3971, 96-4178, 97-4130, 1998 WL 939884, at *4 (6th Cir. 1998).
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that "[p]hysical harassment lies along a continuum just as
verbal harassment does,"" the "severity continuums" are
not entirely parallel: significant verbal harassment, though
certainly actionable in itself with a strong showing of
pervasiveness, does not generally carry the same weight as
significant physical harassment.
C. Threats of PhysicalHarm
Two types of physical threats are generally found in
hostile work environment cases. First there are threats that
in some way seem to directly relate to the sexual desire of
the harasser. For instance, in Baskerville v. Culligan
International Co., the Seventh Circuit noted in dicta that
remarks that would otherwise be "merely mildly offensive. .
. might acquire a sinister cast when . . . accompanied by
threatening gestures . .. ."76 In 2005, the Eleventh Circuit

found that a harasser's frequent sexual comments and three
instances of physical touching were "sufficiently severe or
pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions" of the
plaintiffs employment in Olson v. Lowe's Home Centers,
Inc." After commenting on the vulgarity of the sexual
comments that were directed at the plaintiff, the court
noted that the harasser's "conduct was also physically
threatening .... [The harasser] rubbed his entire body (not
merely a hand or hip) against Olson on two occasions. The
rubbing was forcible and not mere brushes. Olson even
sustained injuries from the kissing incident."" In an earlier
Eleventh Circuit case, Johnson v. Booker T. Washington
BroadcastingService, Inc., the court found that a harasser's
behavior that included giving "Johnson unwanted
massages, standing so close to Johnson that his body parts
touched her from behind, and pulling his pants tight to
reveal the imprint of his private parts" was behavior that
could reasonably be deemed "physically threatening."" The
Second Circuit found the physically threatening nature of a
supervisor's interactions with the plaintiff important in

Hostetler,218 F.3d at 808.
76 50.F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995).
" 130 F. App'x 380, 388 (11th Cir. 2005).
76

78 Id.
79 234 F.3.d 501, 509 (11th Cir. 2000).
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Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc." Along with harassing remarks,
the supervisor "would stand very close to women when
talking to them" while looking them up and down and would
back them into corners." The court found that "the
physically threatening nature of . . . [the supervisor's]

behavior, which repeatedly ended with him backing Cruz
into the wall . . . brings this case over the line separating

merely offensive or boorish conduct from actionable sexual
harassment."8 2
The second type of physical threats found in hostile work
environment cases involve implicit or explicit threats of
physical violence that are unrelated to sexual desire.
Although the majority of the cases discussed thus far have
involved harassment that appears to be in some way related
to sexual desire, it is important to note that "expressions of
sex-based animus rather than misdirected sexual desire"
are still "actionable under Title VII as long as there is
evidence suggesting that the objectionable workplace
behavior is based on the sex of the target."8 3 As the Fourth

Circuit pointed out in Smith v. First Union NationalBank,

an employee need only show that "she was harassed
'because of her 'sex,"' and that "a woman's work
environment can be hostile even if she is not subjected to
sexual advances or propositions."" The court emphasized
that sex-based abuse that is not motivated by the harasser's
sexual desire should not be viewed as inherently any less
repugnant or less violative of Title VII than abuse that is,
as "[a] work environment consumed by remarks that
intimidate, ridicule, and maliciously demean the status of
women can create an environment that is as hostile as an
environment that contains unwanted sexual advances.""
Indeed, this was an important point in the Supreme Court's
decision in Oncale, in which Justice Scalia wrote that
harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual
desire to support an inference of discrimination on the
basis of sex. A trier of fact might reasonably find such
80 202

F.3d 560, 571 (2d Cir. 2000).
Id.
82 Id.
83 Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 1999).
84 202 F.3d 234, 241-42 (4th Cir. 2000).
85 Id. at 242.
81
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discrimination, for example, if a female victim is
harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by
another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is
motivated by a general hostility to the presence of
women in the workplace.86

In the Oncale case there was no indication that the
pervasive harassment delivered upon the plaintiff by
members of his own sex was in any way based in sexual
desire." Still, the Court found that such conduct could be
actionable, so long as the actions could be shown to rise to
the level of "discrimina[tion] . .. because of.

.

. sex.""

Allegations of this second type of physical threat appear
rather frequently in hostile environment sexual harassment
cases, and proof of such threats often carries significant
weight with courts. In Nieto v. Kapoor, the Tenth Circuit
found that a doctor's numerous aggressive acts toward other
hospital employees-including instances in which he "yelled
at them, pointed his finger in their faces .

. .

. threw charts,

papers, and other objects" at them-were objectively
physically threatening, and undoubtedly sufficiently severe
to create a hostile work environment.' In Smith v. First
Union National Bank, mentioned above, the plaintiff was
subjected to frequent barrages of gender-based insults by
her supervisor, some of which were directed at the plaintiff
specifically, while others "reflected . . . [the harasser's]

hostile view of women in general."9 0 But the plaintiff also
presented evidence of even more sinister, physically
threatening conduct:
Scoggins' behavior toward Smith was often threatening.
For instance, Scoggins began standing over Smith's
cubicle and barking orders at her. Scoggins often

concluded his order to Smith with the remark, "or else
you'll see what will happen to you." Scoggins also

threatened Smith when he called her at home at 10:00

86523
87

U.S. 75, 80 (1998).

Id
88
Id. at 81.
89268 F.3d 1208, 1219 (10th Cir. 2001).
90 202 F.3d at 238.
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p.m., accusinr her of conspiring with his supervisor ...
to "get him." 9

Although the court considered the numerous biased
remarks of the supervisor to be important, it gave special
emphasis to the physically threatening nature of several of
the supervisor's actions, at least one of which "a jury could
find was a thinly veiled threat to kill Smith because of her
gender in a way that made Smith feel that he was serious
about harming her. . . ."92 The Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment to the
defendant, noting that "the factors in Harrisstrongly weigh
toward a finding that Scoggins' harassment, if proven at
trial, was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to create a
hostile work environment."9"
The type of threats in Nieto and First Union National
Bank appear to stem from the harasser's general hostility
to-and belief in the inferiority of-women. But often such
physical threats are accompanied by a specific retaliatory
intent. For instance, in Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport
International,Inc., the president of the company employing
the plaintiff "slammed his clenched fist on his desk and
screamed that he would fire her on the spot if she ever
mentioned sexual discrimination again" after the plaintiff
criticized his response to her allegations of disparate
treatment and harassment.9 4 The court found this to be a
physically threatening, "powerful incident of gender-based
intimidation," which, when combined with various other
(less severe) instances of harassment, provided "ample
support for the jury finding of severe and pervasive conduct
. . . . Indeed, in our view, the conduct evidenced here is
extreme."9 5 In Kaytor v. Electric Boat Corporation, the
plaintiffs supervisor repeatedly exposed her to various
forms of harassment, including death threats." The Second
Circuit emphasized one of these instances in particular,
when the plaintiff finally confronted her harasser, and told
him "that if he did not stop harassing her, she would
91

92

Id. at 239.
Id. at 243.

93 Id.

94 227 F.3d 179, 198 (4th Cir. 2000).
9

Id. at 198-99.

96 609 F.3d 537, 551 (2d Cir. 2010).
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complain to higher management; she was deterred from
doing so because he got a 'horrid look on his face' and said
that if she reported him he would kill her."
Regardless of a harasser's motivations behind making
them, all circuits appear to agree that "[tihe presence of ...
physical threats undeniably strengthens a hostile work
environment claim"-usually significantly so."

Southern

District of New York Judge Robert L. Carter went so far as
to hold that "when conduct in the workplace is physically
threatening to an individual because of his membership in a
protected class, that conduct will almost always create a
hostile work environment.""9 It seems, then, that threats to
do physical harm-be they verbal or physical, implicit or
explicit-are considered by courts to be substantially
"severe," and so a showing of a limited number (or possibly
even a single instance) of such threats would presumably
count heavily towards a finding of severe or pervasive
harassment.
III. SEVERE CONDUCT IN DANGEROUS JOBS
Thus far this paper has discussed three types of
harassing conduct that have been- deemed by courts to be
especially severe-so much so that only limited showings of
"pervasiveness" are required to pass the "severe or
pervasive" test. First, especially offensive verbal
harassment-such as the district sales manager's comment
to black employees in Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life
Insurance Co. that "[y]ou black guys are too fucking dumb
to be insurance agents"-has been seen, on occasion, to rise
to this level.'" Second, many types of physical harassmentconduct involving the touching of the victim by the
harasser-have been found to be particularly severe. In the
case of "non-intimate" physical harassment, when such
harassment is coupled with verbal harassment-such as the
bear hug and direct request for oral sex in Barna v. City of
Cleveland-only a limited number of such incidents have
been required in order to rise to the level of severe or
97

Id.

98 White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 298 n.6 (4th Cir. 2004).

9 Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 820, 825 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
100 12 F.3d 668, 671 (1993).
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pervasive harassment.o' When the physical harassment is
"intimate," courts have often required a showing of only a
few incidents-the forcible kissing and undoing of the
victim's brassiere in Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc.102 -or
even one extremely severe incident-the rapes in Ferris v.
DeltaAir Lines, Inc. and Al-Dabbagh v. Greenpeace,Inc.o 3 in order to satisfy the severe or pervasive test. Third, a
harasser's threats, be they implicit or explicit, to do some
sort of physical harm to the victim carry great weight with
courts. This is the case regardless of whether the threats
are apparently motivated by the sexual desires of the
harasser-the leering and encroaching of the supervisor in
Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., for example;'" by a harasser's
general animus towards a particular sex-as was the case
in the supervisor's thinly veiled threats to kill the plaintiff
because of her gender in Smith v. First Union National
Bank;05 or by retaliation for a victim's complaints of
harassment-the company president's slamming of his fist
upon the plaintiffs mention of sexual harassment in Conner
v. Schrader-BridgeportInternational,Inc.'0 6
These three types of conduct do not exhaust the universe
of actions that courts have found to be particularly severe,
however. In certain "high-risk" professions-those in which
employees are subjected to regular, substantial risks of
physical harm--courts have often found that two other
types of conduct can prove to be particularly severe. The
first type of such conduct is a refusal of the employee's
colleagues to provide backup. This type of harassment
appears to happen with some frequency between police
officers, firefighters, and prison guards. Although refusal to
provide backup differs from the traditional type of "physical
threat" discussed above (as it usually-but not alwaysinvolves inaction/silence while traditional physical threats
involve affirmative acts), it appears to be best analogized to
physically threatening conduct, and courts seem to view a
101 No. 96-3971, 96-4178, 97-4130, 1998 WL 939884, at *4 (6th Cir. 1998).
102 218 F.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2000).
103 Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 227 F.3d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 2001); see also AlDabbagh v. Greenpeace, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 1105, 1108 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
104 202 F.3d 560, 571 (2d Cir. 2000).
105 202 F.3d 234, 239, 242 (4th Cir. 2000).
106 227 F.3d 179, 191 (4th Cir. 2000).
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refusal of backup to be as severe as affirmative physical
threats.
The second type of conduct involves acts taken by
individuals that undermine the authority of the victim and
disrupt the cohesion that is necessary for the effective
functioning of individuals in high-risk professions. As with
the refusal to provide backup, this harassment generally
takes place between police officers, firefighters, and prison
guards. The perceived severity of this conduct also appears
to be comparable to harassment involving physical threats,
though the focus of the harm somewhat differs: not only are
the victims themselves put at risk by such conduct, but
third parties (uninvolved co-workers, citizens in need of
assistance, etc.) are as well.

A. The Severity ofRefusals to Provide Backup
in DangerousJobs
The existing case law on refusal to provide backup in
high-risk professions is perhaps surprisingly robust. A
representative example is Semsroth v. City of Wichita, a
Tenth Circuit case in which three female police officers
brought disparate treatment, disparate impact, retaliation,
and hostile work environment claims against the city and
the police chief.07 Officer Semsroth primarily relied on four
instances of harassing conduct to support her hostile work
environment claim: a retaliatory transfer, the use of the
word "bitch" by other officers to refer to her, the failure of
the department to discipline an officer who refused her
backup, and an unpleasant "interrogation" by a supervising
officer.' In finding that these incidents were sufficient for
the plaintiffs hostile work environment claim to survive
summary judgment, the court noted that
[olf particular moment in considering the severity of the
alleged harassment was the failure of Semsroth's
supervisors to discipline Officer Nixon for failing to
provide backup for Semsroth. . . . Nixon's failure to

provide backup could have put Semsroth in physical
danger. And a jury could find that her supervisor's
failure to address the issue adequately and discipline
107
108

304 F. App'x 707, 710 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 722.
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Nixon could create a risk that this conduct would be
repeated.109

Although the court found that all of the alleged incidents
could support Semsroth's hostile work environment claim, it
gave special emphasis to the failure of her fellow officer to
provide her with backup.110
In Zelinski v. Pennsylvania State Police, the Third
Circuit was faced with a similarly limited number of
episodes of alleged harassing conduct."' Zelinski, a state
trooper, pointed to five instances in which she was
harassed: one instance of non-intimate physical touching (of
her leg), one unwelcome advance by a fellow officer, two
inappropriate comments (that referred to Trooper Zelinski's
clothing), and one instance in which another officer
allegedly failed to provide the plaintiff with assistance
during an undercover drug operation. 2 In reversing the
district court's grant of summary judgment to the
defendant, the court found that
[ilf Weinstock failed to provide Zelinski with protection
[during the undercover operation] and if there was a
connection between Zelinski's rejections of Weinstock's
advances and the failure to provide protection, then a
reasonable jury may conclude that the harassment was
sufficiently severe and pervasive. By failing to provide
Zelinski with adequate protection in the dangerous and
sometimes deadly world of drug law enforcement,
Weinstock may have created a hostile work
environment." 3

Language in Zelinski suggests that even apart from the
other instances of harassing conduct, if Zelinski was refused
backup because of her sex, this conduct alone could be
sufficient to create a hostile work environment in violation
of Title VII."

109

Id. at 726.

110 Id

111 108 F. App'x 700, 704 (3d Cir. 2004).
112

Id. at 704.

13
114

Id.
Id. at 704-05.
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The Tenth Circuit placed a similarly strong reliance on
the context of the harassment in Apgar v. State of
Wyoming."' Apgar, a former highway patrol officer, received
unpleasant treatment by a number of Wyoming Highway
Patrol officers who believed that, in the words of one of the
male officers, "women did not belong in law enforcement.""'
However, most of the harassment, though frequent, was
verbal, non-threatening, and not flagrantly outrageous."'
The court conceded that "this is a close case. The genderbased conduct laid out above does not appear particularly
severe or pervasive when viewed in isolation and compared
to the blatantly inappropriate behavior found in many
hostile environment cases.""' But the court emphasized that
in its analysis of the events as a whole,
we pay particular attention to the setting and context in
which the discriminatory behavior occurred. .. . [W]e
must evaluate the evidence presented in in the context of
Ms. Apgar's unique work environment-patrolling the
nation's highways as a law enforcement officer.... When
viewed from this perspective, we hold a reasonable jury
could infer Ms. Apgar's co-workers and superiors made
her work environment a hostile one because she was a
woman.119

The court found that a reasonable person in Apgar's
position could view the environment as hostile, which was
"especially true when considered in light of what Ms. Apgar
describes as the failure to back her up during her search for
[two escaped convicts] ...

.0

The above cases all concern situations involving police
officers and the harassment they suffer at the hands of their
fellow officers. But circuit courts have addressed similar
claims of failure to provide backup in other contexts as well.
In Jemmott v. Coughlin, a Second Circuit hostile work
environment race discrimination case, the plaintiff, a
corrections officer at a prison, alleged a number of
115

No. 99-8029, 2000 WL 1059444, at *5 (10th Cir. Aug. 2, 2000).
Id. at *1.
117 Id. at *2.
118 Id. at *5.
119 Id. (internal citations omitted).
120
Id. at *6.
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discriminatory and retaliatory acts by white prison
employees. 2 ' In affirming the district court's denial of the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court found
that "[als alleged by Jemmott, each defendant intentionally
jeopardized his ability to perform or even keep his job. . . or
put him in danger of physical harm ([by] refusing to send
requested back-up assistance, and humiliating him in front

of prisoners he is required to control)."1 2

The court

concluded that such harassment, if true, was "sufficiently
severe to create a hostile or abusive work environment
under the factors articulated in Harris."2 3
Many district courts have also commented on the
importance of effective backup assistance in high-risk jobs,
and how "severe" a refusal to provide backup is considered
to be. Collins v. Village of Woodridge presented a dramatic
set of facts to the Northern District of Illinois: the estate of
a female police officer sued the village and individuals
employed by the police department for violations of Title VII
and constitutional rights when the officer committed suicide
because, as the officer's sister alleged, "her superior officer
had made the work environment hostile to women and
because of the way she was treated by other supervisory
personnel in retaliation for complaining about the superior
officer."'2 4 The defendants argued that while they did not
doubt that the officer (Frederiksen) subjectively believed the
environment was hostile, no reasonable person could have
regarded it as such.'2 5 Although there was other alleged
harassing conduct, the court relied almost entirely on one
statement by one of Frederiksen's commanding officers,
Sergeant Donald Janus. Less than a month into her
employment with the police department, Janus had told
Frederiksen that "women are the weaker sex and do not
belong in law enforcement. You will have to prove yourself
to be accepted by the guys, and they will probably let you get
your ass kicked several times." 2' The court responded with
a powerful criticism of Janus's comment, explaining that
although
121

85 F.3d 61, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1996).
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Id at 67.

123 Id.
124 96

F. Supp. 2d 744, 746 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
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perhaps isolated in the sense that they were not
recurring, Janus' alleged comments cannot be divorced
from their context. As a police officer, Frederiksen held a
position in which her safety could be at risk at any time.
Like all police officers, she would depend on her partner,
fellow officers, and superiors to provide assistance and
backup in potentially life-threatening situations. The
officer on duty has to rely on the fact (not the mere hope
or possibility) that such support will be forthcoming if
and when she needs and asks for it. Seen in this light,
Janus' statements to Frederiksen, though isolated,
attacked the very foundations ofher day-to-day existence
and personal safety as a police officer.

. .

. Indeed, his

statement that Frederiksen would have to get her "ass
kicked" before male officers-more or less everyone else
in the Department-would accept her could be
interpreted in an objective sense as creating the most
hostile work environment imaginable . .. simply because

she was a woman. 127

This explanation captures the extreme severity of refusals
to provide backup: they are akin to physical threats,
assurances that when one finds oneself faced with a
potentially dangerous situation, one cannot count on
assistance that others in similar situations would be
provided. As such dangerous situations are almost assured
in these types of high-risk professions, the "threat" is
palpable: one's life will be in the hands of one's fellow
officers, and those officers have indicated that they feel no
obligation to fulfill their duties to provide backup.
In Hartley v. Pocono Mountain Regional Police
Department, a Middle District of Pennsylvania case, the
plaintiff, a female police officer, alleged that she had been
subjected to a hostile work environment as a result of acts
perpetrated by three fellow patrolmen. 128 The conduct the
plaintiff complained of was not especially pervasive-one
"public rebuke," the refusal of the three officers to accept
the plaintiff as a backup, their failure to back the plaintiff
up when she was out on calls, and their falsely accusing the
plaintiff of misconduct.12 9 Still, the court found that
127
128
12 9

Id. at 750 (second emphasis added).
No. 3:04-CV-2045, 2007 WL 906180, at *1-2 (M.D.Pa. Mar. 22, 2007).
Id. at *2.

26

BUFFALO JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAW & SocIAL POLIcY

Vol. XX

[although not compelling, Plaintiffs evidence, viewed in
its entirety, is sufficient to create a jury question with
the respect to the elements of a hostile work
environment claim. In particular,evidence that certain
male police officers failed to provide backup for Plaintiff
could support a rationalconclusion of severe or pervasive
harassment. . . . Exposing a female police officer to

handle calls without the protection of another officer can
be a powerful means of intimidation.13 0

Despite the near total lack of the type of conduct usually
present in hostile work environment cases-for example,
the court found "no evidence of sexual advances or
derogatory or demeaning comments"-the fact that backup
had been refused changed a course of conduct that might
otherwise have been viewed by a court to be merely
unpleasant into actionable, "severe" harassment.
These district court cases represent but a few of the
cases in which courts have considered a refusal to provide
backup to be especially "severe" conduct.'3 2 Of course, not all
cases in which a refusal to provide backup has been alleged
survive summary judgment. In Chavez v. City of Osceola, for
example, the court found that a former probationary police
officer had failed to demonstrate that he was subjected to a
racially hostile work environment, despite his allegation
that he had been refused backup.' 3 The court found that
there was simply no proof of such conduct, or of a plan to
deny the plaintiff backup: the plaintiff merely alleged that
"one stormy night" while on duty he did not receive
requested backup, and he admitted that he "did not know
why they did not respond."13 4 Similarly, in Olsen v. Ammons,
130 Id. at *4 (emphasis added).

Id. at *2, *4.
See, e.g., King v. City of New Kensington, Civil Action No. 06-1015, 2008 WL
4492503, at *19 (W.D.Pa. Sept. 30, 2008) (finding that plaintiffs fellow officer's
refusal to provide plaintiff with backup was "pervasive or severe"
discrimination); see also Kramarski v. Village of Orland Park, No. 00 C 2487,
2002 WL 1827637, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2002) (noting that individual incidents
of harassment "may not seem so severe as to create an objectively hostile work
environment," but that the refusal to provide plaintiff with backup was "at least
potentially physically threatening ... and would unreasonably interfere with a
novice police officer's work").
133 324 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995-96 (S.D. Iowa 2004).
13 4 Id. at 996.
131

132
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the court found that the plaintiff, a female former police
officer, could not establish the existence of a hostile work
environment despite her allegations of a "secret
departmental policy" to deny certain individuals backup.'
The court noted that the plaintiff did "not allege that she
was in fact denied backup; additionally, the policy was
secret, so she was never threatened with being denied
backup," so she could not have been "subjectively offended"
by the conduct (if it had in fact occurred).3
Despite the fact that the courts in Chavez and Olsen
were not persuaded by the plaintiffs' allegations of refusals
to provide backup, both of those courts took time to point
out that their conclusions might very well have differed if
the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence. In Chavez,
the court noted that "Chavez' claim that Townsley failed or
refused to provide backup, if true, would be a matter to be
taken more seriously.

." 3 The court in Olsen echoed this

sentiment, asserting that it agreed "with Plaintiff that
refusing to provide a fellow police officer with backup
because of gender would support a hostile work
environment claim because it would indicate severe or
pervasive gender discrimination," and further stating that
"[elven threatening a plaintiff police officer with denial of
backup supports a hostile work environment claim."'
What all of these cases collectively establish is that
courts take refusals to provide backup in high-risk jobs very
seriously. Such a refusal is considered to be an especially
"severe" form of conduct, one that is comparable to
affirmative threats to do physical harm to the victim.
Because such conduct is considered to be so severe, a
plaintiff who can establish that he or she has been denied
backup-or has been threatened with the denial of
backup-will stand a strong chance of surviving a
defendant's motion for summary judgment.

No. 1:CV-09-0057, 2009 WL 4573581, at *6-7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2009).
Id. at *6.
137 Chavez, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 996.
138 Olsen, 2009 WL 4573581, at *6.
135
136
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B. The Severity of Conduct thatDiminishesAuthority
and Undermines Cohesion in DangerousJobs
A line of cases originating in the Second Circuit
considers conduct that could undermine the cohesion that is
necessary for the effective functioning of individuals in
high-risk professions to be very severe. One frequently cited
case, Howley v. Town of Stratford, comes from the Second
Circuit, and involved a female lieutenant-the lone female
in the Stratford Fire Department-who claimed that actions
primarily taken by a subordinate, Holdsworth, created a
hostile work environment in which she was subjected to
sexual harassment.'3 9 The district court had granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, primarily
because the claim emphasized a single incident of especially
severe verbal harassment.14 0 The Second Circuit reversed,
noting that
[alithough Holdsworth made his obscene comments only
on one occasion, the evidence is that he did so at length,
loudly, and in a large group..

.

. In an occupation whose

success in preserving life and property often depends on
firefighters' unquestioning execution of line-of-command
orders in emergency situations, the fomenting of gender
based skepticism as to the competence of a commanding
officer may easily have the effect . .. of diminishing the

respect accorded the officer by subordinates and thereby
impairing her ability to lead in the life-threatening
circumstances often faced by firefighters.141
Note that the court was not exclusively addressing threats
to Howley that could result from the undermining of her
authority. The court seems here to be envisioning a
breakdown of command that could endanger the safety of
all individuals in an emergency situation, including Howley,
her fellow firefighters, and those whom firefighters are
tasked with protecting.142 In criticizing the town's response
to Holdsworth's harassment, the court further emphasized
217 F.3d 141, 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2000).
140 1d. at 149.
14 1
Id. at 154.
142 As to this last interested party, the court later notes that Holdsworth's
insubordination "may have jeopardized the lives or property of persons he was
supposed to help." Id. at 155-56.
139
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the particular threat that such conduct presented to
firefighters:
Because the ordinary dangers of the profession involve
emergency situations in which firefighters must rely on
each other and have confidence in their commanding
officers, the Town's failure to take any remedial action . .
. to remedy Holdsworth's public attempt to undermine
Howley's authority may be viewed as an inappropriate
143
response.
Again, the threat here is not specific to Howley (although it
certainly includes her). The severity of the conduct lies in
the impact that it could have on the functioning of the
department as a whole.
Another Second Circuit "undermining" case arose in the
prison context. In Dawson v. County of Westchester, seven
female correctional officers at a male facility alleged that
they had been subjected to a hostile work environment and
retaliation in violation of Title VII.'" The harassment
allegedly began with a letter written by inmates of the
facility-addressed to all of the female correctional
officers-which "contained degrading, explicit, and violent
sexual references to individual female COs" and featured an
obscene drawing.'4 5 A male sergeant apparently photocopied
and disseminated this and another similar letter
throughout the facility.14 6 The plaintiffs alleged that in the
days following the dissemination "they were subjected to a
barrage of inappropriate stares, whispers, laughter, and
remarks from their colleagues," including lewd, demeaning
comments, and "sexually charged references" to their
physical appearances.'4 7 In granting the defendant's motion
for summary judgment, the district court had focused on the
content of the inmate-written letters, finding that the
female officers' "chosen occupation necessarily places them
in the company of prison inmates, 'men not distinguished
for commendable deportment or courtly display of social
graces,' and that as a result, 'exposure to an occasional
Id. at 156.
'4 373 F.3d 265, 267-68 (2d Cir. 2004).
145 Id. at 268.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 269.
148
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'embarrassing remark or situation' is to be expected."'4 8 In
reversing the district court, Judge Calabresi of the Second
Circuit noted that "such behavior by prisoners is not, and
cannot be, the benchmark against which to measure the
conduct of plaintiffs' own colleagues."'4 9 He continued:
[iindeed, in the prison context especially, officers must
depend on their co-workers for mutual protection and
rely upon them for their own ability to assert authority
over others in potentially dangerous situations. In such a
setting, actions of co-officers and superiors that
undermine an officer's sense of personal safety or

compromise her capacity to command respect and obtain
compliance from co-workers, subordinates, and inmates
assume greater, not lesser, significance. 50
Judge Calabresi noted that female officers were particularly
vulnerable to this potential "diminution of authority," not
because of any inherent qualities "but rather because of
stereotypical assumptions about the propriety of women
exercising authority in traditionally male-dominated
occupations."'' Similar to Howley, the court appears here to
be concerned with more than just the individual
harassment victim's safety, but rather with the safety
hazards that could befall all officers as a result of the
breakdown of control over the prison environment-a
of
weakening
by
the
on
brought
breakdown
intradepartmental cohesion through acts of sex-based
harassment.
"Undermining" issues have also arisen in the hostile
environment race discrimination context. In Cruz v.
Liberatore, a Hispanic police officer alleged that a superior
officer had created a hostile work environment by insulting
Cruz about his ethnicity, selectively enforcing work rules
against him, repeatedly humiliating him, and physically
assaulting him (by slapping him in the face).' 52 Though it
noted that "this is a very close case," the court found that
148 Id. at 273 (quoting Dawson v. County of Westchester, 274 F. Supp. 2d 364,
375 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 582 F. Supp. 2d 508, 512-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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"reasonable jurors could disagree about the conduct about
which Officer Cruz complained," as "Inspector Liberatore's
conduct, although not frequent or pervasive, was 'severe,'
'physically threatening,' and 'humiliating.""" The court gave
particular emphasis to the fact that "Inspector Liberatore's
alleged physical assault . . occurred within the context of a
paramilitary organization where trust between superiors
and their subordinates, as well as an officer's reputation
amongst fellow officers, is of the utmost importance.""'
These and other "undermining cases" support the
proposition that some courts will view "threats" in a broader
context in certain high-risk professions.' The threat courts
envision such conduct engendering is one that could
certainly jeopardize the safety of the victims of the
harassment. But courts see such conduct as posing a risk to
the victim's fellow officers/co-workers and the individuals
that members of such professions are tasked with
protecting. By creating a hostile work environment,
harassers undermine the cohesion that is critical to the
effective discharge of the duties of such professions.
CONCLUSION

Over time, courts have come to embrace the disjunctive
nature of the severe or pervasive test. Although courts
consider both the severity and pervasiveness of harassing
conduct, a strong showing of severity-such as egregious
verbal harassment, intimate physical touching, or threats to
physically harm the target of the harassment-will often
persuade courts that even a limited showing of
pervasiveness will bring the harassment to a level that
satisfies Harris's test. In certain high-risk professions,
courts have identified additional types of conduct that they
153 Id. at 518-19 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
154 Id. at 519.

155 See also Fairbrother v. Morrison, 412 F.3d 39, 51 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that
significant verbal harassment against a female employee at mental health
facility "made Fairbrother and her patients 'anxious,' thereby creating a
potentially dangerous work environment"); Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear
Operations, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 2d 427, 438-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that
alleged harassment took place between "armed security officers guarding a
nuclear power plant that has been described as one of the nation's highest
consequence targets," and finding that this is a relevant consideration in the
assessment of the plaintiffs claim).
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have deemed to be especially severe: refusals to provide
backup and other conduct that undermines the cohesion
and authority that are necessary to preserve a safe
environment in such contexts. Although courts sometimes
vary unpredictably on what constitutes severe or pervasive
conduct, the willingness of many courts to heavily weigh
both the context in which the harassment occurs and the
severity of that conduct against a lack of pervasiveness
shows that such courts take seriously the Supreme Court's
command to consider "all the circumstances" surrounding
allegations of hostile work environment sexual harassment.

